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While the status and composition of all regions may be inherently artificial, the
position of Southeast Asia is especially contentious. The very idea of ‘Southeast
Asia’ as a discrete, geographically demarcated area, is emblematic of the
dependant and peripheral position that most countries of Southeast Asia have
experienced over the last two hundred years. The very notion of ‘Asia’ as we
currently think of it is a product of that complex area’s interaction with the
European powers (Korhonen 1997). At a more tangible level, the development
of the disparate societies of Southeast Asia in particular, has been defined and
delimited by the simultaneous intrusion of the Western powers and the
concomitant expansion of capitalism as the dominant mode of economic
organisation throughout the world (Beeson 2001). Indeed, it is possible to argue
that the latterly independent nations of the region are both creations of, and still
struggling to come to terms with, this complex and problematic historical legacy.
In short, the countries of modern Southeast Asia, both as independent nations
and as colonies of various imperial powers, have been highly vulnerable to the
actions of more powerful political and economic forces in the wider international
system. The impact of such forces, and the degree of success with which the
nations of Southeast Asia have managed them, will be among the central
concerns of this essay.
Consequently, the first part of this paper places the Southeast Asian region in
its specific historical context. I argue that it is simply not possible to understand
the economic challenges and the political responses that have emerged in what
we now think of as Southeast Asia without giving appropriate consideration to
the – often overwhelmingly powerful – external forces that have shaped the
region. Not only have such forces fundamentally influenced the course of
domestic political and economic development, and led to a concomitant
preoccupation with nation-building and the protection of national sovereignty,
but they have also underpinned a number of important intra-regional
developments. The second part of the paper considers the rise and fall of the
‘Southeast Asian miracle’, a process of economic development that initially
seemed to hold out the possibility that the region might escape from its
vulnerable position, but which now seems to confirm it. Finally, and given the
foregoing constraints, I consider what sort of presence the Southeast Asian
region has on the wider world stage in which inter-regional interaction is coming
to play an increasingly important role. Here I suggest that the historical pattern
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of Southeast Asian vulnerability and subordination to greater external forces
looks set to continue, albeit in slightly different ways.
Southeast Asia in Historical Context
One of the defining characteristics of Southeast Asia is its heterogeneity. In
stark contrast with Western Europe, there is very little ‘natural’ basis for regional
development. Apart from sheer geographical contingency and the arbitrary
organisational requirements of Britain’s military operations in Asia during World
War 2,1 there is no obvious reason why the countries of the region should be
considered as constituting a distinct region at all. At the level of brute
geography, it is not clear why Myanmar, for example, should be included in
Southeast Asia. Conversely, Papua New Guinea is clearly geographically part
of the region, but has not been incorporated into all of the political expressions
of ‘regionness’, in which the ‘passive object’ of geography is translated into ‘an
active subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging
region’ (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000: 457). For the purposes of this essay, it
will be this latter, more actively constructed sense of regional identity that will be
of central concern.
Yet even if the region is more narrowly defined in this manner, it is important to
re-emphasise just how disparate and divergent the nations of the region are.
The most important political expression of this nascent regionalism2 is the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which now embraces most of
the countries of Southeast Asia. In addition to the founding members Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore, the organisation has
expanded to include, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and – most
controversially – Myanmar. I shall consider the possible ‘widening and
deepening’ of ASEAN in more detail later, but overall I shall give greatest
analytical attention to the pivotal founding members of ASEAN. The point to
note at this stage, however, is that ASEAN, and the geographic region it
represents, encompasses a complex mosaic of political structures, levels of
economic development and more expansively defined cultural practices. At one
level this is manifest in the gulf between Singaporean city-state’s ‘first world’
living standards, on the one hand, and the impoverished and much larger
populations of the Indo-Chinese region and Indonesia on the other. At another
level, there are major differences between say Buddhist Thailand, Islamic
Indonesia and Malaysia, and the Christian stronghold of the Philippines – to say
nothing of the increasingly fractious ethnic and religious minorities each of these
countries contains within their respective borders.
                                                
1 The notion of a distinct Southeast Asian region only came into being during the Second World
War, when the British established a South-East Asia Command to coordinate the war effort
against the Japanese (Korhonen 1997: 356).
2 It has now become conventional to distinguish ‘regionalism’ , or state-led cooperative political
projects, from ‘regionalisation’, or processes that are primarily market-driven. Such a distinction
can also be applied respectively to de jure or de facto processes of regional integration. For
useful discussions of these issues, see Hurrell (1995) and Oman (1994).
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The disparate ethnic and religious formations that are so characteristic of the
region, and which present such a profound challenge to national and regional
coherence, serve as a powerful reminder of just how profoundly the region has
been shaped by external forces. Whether it is the impact of successive waves
of religious traditions over the course of several millennia, or the more recent
impact of Western colonialism, Southeast Asia – for better or worse – owes
much of its contemporary shape to exogenous influences. The incorporation of
much of Southeast Asia into a powerful, increasingly global capitalist system, in
a process that fundamentally transformed existent social structures and gave
economic control to the colonial powers, helps to explain why most of Southeast
Asia has been plagued by poverty ever since (Reid 2000). As Bob Elson
argues, when confronted with the intrusion of a Western capitalist economic
order undergirded by an irresistible military capacity local peoples had two
options: ‘cooperation or ignominy’ (Elson 1992: 140).
Significantly, the origins of the contemporary political structures of Southeast
Asia, and many of the problems that have subsequently confronted them, can
be traced to the intrusion and subsequent withdrawal of the colonial powers
from Southeast Asia over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The expansion of the states system from Europe throughout the rest of the
world not only generated an overarching institutional infrastructure into which
the freshly minted states of post-colonial Asia would subsequently aspire to fit
(Watson 1992), but it also profoundly influenced the domestic shape of those
states. The development of domestic bureaucracies, the scope and style of
government, and the increasing centralisation of power, all reflected the
influence of European organisational practices (Elson 1992). And yet, when
many of the European colonial powers were finally expelled from the region in
the aftermath of the Second World War, following their humiliating defeats at the
hands of Asia’s first successful industrial power – the Japanese – the newly
independent governments found themselves confronting profound challenges of
nation-building and economic development.
The challenges of independence
The leaders of Southeast Asia’s newly independent nations faced problems that
other regions have not had to confront in the same way, not the least of which
was the challenge of nation-building itself. This problem was compounded by
the complex ethnic legacy of colonialism. The dominant European powers
encouraged large scale migration into the region to supply the labour needs of
their colonial empires. Indentured labour from China in particular, not only
created racial divisions which have provided potential sources of social conflict
in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, but they laid the foundations for an
enduring source of economic power that has shaped subsequent economic and
political development throughout the region. The ‘overseas Chinese’, for
example, or the estimated 50 million or so ethnic Chinese resident in Asia
outside China, are now a powerful economic and political force in Southeast
Asia. As a consequence of these multifaceted questions of ethnic and national
identity, plus the difficulty of operating within fragile political structures that often
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lacked political legitimacy, to say nothing of the broader challenge of promoting
economic development, the governments of these emergent nations developed
a predictable preoccupation with internal stability and security (Ayoob 1995). In
such circumstances, the development of the authoritarian rule that is so
characteristic of much of the region’s history is perhaps unsurprising.
Yet it is important to recognise that authoritarianism took hold in post-war
Southeast Asia under very different circumstances from those which prevail
today. One of the reasons that Indonesia, for example, was able to rid itself of
Dutch colonial rule, was that it had the support of the United States. The US
had assumed the hegemonic leadership of the capitalist ‘free world’ and was
preoccupied with shoring up potential allies against its ideological rival, the
Soviet Union. In the context of the Cold War, the US was not only prepared to
bully a number of its European allies into recognising that the colonial moment
had passed, but it was equally prepared to turn a blind eye to the installation of
non-democratic, authoritarian leaders throughput the region – as long as they
were either within the Western capitalist camp, or at least not aligned to their
socialist opponents (McMahon 1999). Indeed, the so-called ‘non-aligned’
nations like Indonesia were able to exploit the rivalry between the American and
Soviet camps to their own advantage at the height of the Cold War (Yahuda
1996). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of this sort of strategic
rivalry in Asia, however, a fundamentally new set of circumstances obtains in
which the US is less prepared to tolerate economic and political practises of
which it does not approve (Buzan and Little 1999; Beeson 1999).
The post-war geo-strategic situation in which the states of Southeast Asia either
gained, or in the case of Thailand, attempted to consolidate their independence,
was a complex mixture of threats and opportunities. Certainly, the economically
tiny and militarily insignificant nations of the region were incapable of
independently affecting the overarching security environment of which they
were a part, but for some countries, at least, there were potential advantages to
be exploited. The Vietnam war may have been a tragedy for much of Indo-
China, but for countries like Singapore and Thailand, it provided – in much the
same way as the earlier Korean War had for Northeast Asia – a catalyst for
export-oriented industrialisation (Stubbs 1999). The other crucial development
that the Vietnam War in particular, and the wider Cold War strategic
contestation in general, helped fuel was the formation of ASEAN.
The numerous criticisms of, and challenges to, ASEAN will be considered in
more detail later, but for all its shortcomings, it remains the most enduring
multilateral institution in the developing world. ASEAN’s very continued
existence in the face of significant threats and obstacles must be considered
some sort of achievement. Much of its early success, and the immediate
motivation for its foundation in 1967, was a direct consequence of its founding
members’ mutual concerns about regional security generally, with the rise of
China and the US intervention in Indochina being issues of particular concern
(Frost 1990: 4). Earlier attempts to create an institutional forum within which to
manage intra-regional relations and tensions had been undermined by disputes
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between Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. ASEAN’s ability to at least
avoid outright conflict between its highlight disparate and fiercely independent
members owes much to the fact that regional relationships were institutionalised
and routinised. The members of ASEAN became socialised into patterns of
conduct and committed to collaborative norms in ways which discouraged
conflict and underpinned ASEAN’s ‘long peace’ (Kivimäki 2001). Yet for all its
comparative success in the security arena, ASEAN has been less successful in
managing or promoting the region’s economic development and intra-regional
relations. In the wake of the Cold War’s end, this has become a more
conspicuous failing. To see why economic issues have proved so problematic, it
is necessary to look more closely at the region’s recent economic development. 
The rise and fall of the Southeast Asian miracle
When the World Bank (1993) produced its seminal report on East Asia’s
‘miraculous’ economic development, it was not just describing established
industrial powers like Japan and the celebrated ‘tiger’ economies of Hong Kong,
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Also included in this group of stellar performers
were Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. When judged by the remarkable
economic growth rates they began to achieve from the 1960s onwards, their
inclusion is not as surprising as it may now seem with the benefit of hindsight.
We now know, of course, that Southeast Asia in general was especially badly
affected by the crisis, but it is important to remember that before the crisis hit
there were very few sceptics about either the basis or the resilience of the
region’s phenomenal performance.3 Paradoxically enough, the positive
sentiment evinced toward the region as a whole, not just by influential
international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank, but also by
increasingly powerful institutional investors, played a major part in unravelling
the Southeast Asian component of the ‘Asian miracle’. Ill-informed institutional
investors recklessly and indiscriminately poured money into ‘Asia’, creating both
the pre-conditions for crisis and unsustainable economic bubbles, especially in
the smaller Southeast Asian economies (Winters 2000). One of the enduring
factors that the crisis highlighted, and which contributed to the dramatic
transformation in the region’s fortunes, has been a failure to adequately
discriminate between the Northern and Southern parts of ‘East Asia’ generally,
and between the individual countries that constitute these very different areas in
particular.
The first step in trying to understand why the countries of Southeast were so
badly affected by the crisis, therefore, is to distinguish between the successive
waves of industrialisation and economic development that have occurred in the
broader East Asian region. Significantly, the original Asian miracle – Japan –
was already an established industrial power even before World War 2. Despite
the devastating blow the war dealt Japan, it had a basic institutional
infrastructure, replete with a competent bureaucracy and – at that time – highly
effective business-government relations which allowed it to ‘catch-up’ with its
                                                
3 For an important exception, see Krugman (1994).
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North America and western European rivals in a remarkable and
unprecedentedly short space of time (Tabb 1995). The Japanese pattern of
state-led industrialisation and economic development proved an influential
model for the majority of the second wave of industrialising nations that followed
in its wake. Of the very successful ‘gang of four’ – Taiwan, Korea, Singapore
and Hong Kong – only Hong Kong was not highly influenced by the Japanese
exemplar (Castells 1992). Crucially, however, these successful acolytes
possessed a number of fundamental advantages that allowed them to emulate
much of Japan’s success in an even more truncated time frame. On the one
hand, they were able to take advantage of a general up-turn in, and
restructuring of, the wider global economy, allowing them to occupy specialist
niches in an emergent ‘new international division of labour’. On the other hand,
they were able to target lucrative export markets, especially in the US, secure in
the knowledge that their often unashamedly mercantilist economic strategies
would be tolerated because of the US’s wider strategic interests. Arguably of
greatest significance, however, was the existence of significant ‘state capacity’,
underpinned by competent and relatively independent bureaucracies (Wade
1990; Weiss and Hobson 1995).
Southeast Asia, by contrast, faced a very different set of circumstances. Firstly,
the industrialisation process generally and the switch to export-oriented
development in particular, occurred a good deal later than in other parts of the
region. Whereas countries like Taiwan and Korea had rapidly industrialised from
the 1950s and shifted toward the promotion of export-oriented manufacturing
industries during the 1960s, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia did not make the
transition from resource-based to more industrialised economies until the 1970s
and 1980s (World Bank 1993). Moreover, even where industrialisation did
occur, this did not mean that the nations of Southeast Asia inevitably replicated
the developmental experience and successes of the earlier waves of
industrialising nations.
The idea that the East Asian region would collectively make a steady progress
toward increasingly sophisticated forms of industrial production underpinned
some of the most powerful ideas about the region and the concomitant
prospects for an ‘Asian century’.4 Amongst a number of influential – mainly
Japanese – economists, this idea was captured in the metaphor of the ‘flying
geese’, in which Japan pioneered the Asian route to industrial development and
pulled along the other regional economies in its wake (see Gangopadhyay
1998). The reality has been very different. Not only have Japanese companies
often not transferred technology to those countries at the bottom of the
developmental pyramid in Southeast Asia, but they have not necessarily shifted
out of lower-value added production in the expected manner either (Bernard
and Ravenhill 1995). Consequently, many neighbouring countries have not only
found it difficult to break into some of the more lucrative and sophisticated forms
of manufacturing, or to establish the sorts of complex domestic linkages that
                                                
4 The literature on the ‘Asian miracle’ and the possibility of a Pacific century is extensive. For a
prescient, critical review of the background issue, see Berger (1997)
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have allowed a ‘deepening’ of the industrialisation process to occur.5 The
smaller economies of the region have, however, found themselves caught up in
a web of complex and constricting economic and political relationships where
investment has occurred (Hatch and Yamamura 1996). 
Japan’s dominance of the wider East Asian economic region has implications
that merit elaboration. Firstly, Japan has been a crucial source of investment for
the rest of the region, especially in the wake of the so-called Plaza Accord6
which saw a fundamental restructuring of Japanese industry as a consequence
of the yen’s appreciation. The massive outflows of Japanese capital that
intensified at the end of the 1980s had an important global impact, but were
especially influential amongst the smaller Southeast Asian economies. But as
Japanese industry moved offshore it did so with the assistance of the Japanese
government in a co-ordinated manner that reproduced the hierarchical
dominance of Japanese industry across the region, effectively locking other
countries into subordinate and dependent positions (Beeson 2001b). As a
consequence, the triangular relationship between Japan, its Asian neighbours
and the lucrative markets of North America and Europe was consolidated, as
Japan exported capital goods to Asia and finished products to the US.
Southeast Asia found itself simultaneously dependant on and vulnerable to
Japan, and to the export markets that underpinned Southeast Asia’s
industrialisation strategies. The structural development of industry in Southeast
Asia and its location in the wider regional scheme of things, helps to explain the
impact of the crisis.
Southeast Asia in crisis
There is no intention of re-telling the story of the East Asian economic crisis in
any detail here, as numerous accounts now exist of this episode.7 However, it is
necessary to highlight a number of aspects of the crisis as it both transformed
the way Southeast Asia is viewed by potential investors and the powerful IFIs
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and fundamentally altered the
circumstances in which future development will take place.
The first point to make about the crisis is that there are a number quite different
explanations of what happened, even though most observers agree on the
basic facts. In essence, the story of the East Asian economic collapse is that in
late 1997 a localised currency crisis in Thailand rapidly and unexpectedly
spread throughout Southeast Asia and then on to Korea and even Japan. This
caused a massive withdraw of capital from the region, a major loss of
confidence in most of its economies, and a collapse in foreign exchange and
                                                
5 The prominent role played by export processing zones in Southeast Asian industrialization has
also entrenched the labor intensive, import dependant nature of much regional manufacturing.
See, Amirahmadi Wu (1995).
6 Under pressure from the US, the Japanese assisted in engineering a major appreciation in the
value of the yen, something that encouraged large scale outflows of capital from Japan and
contributed to the development of Japan’s bubble economy. See Leaver (1993).
7 See, for example, Robison, R. et al (2000), Noble and Ravenhill (2000), and Pempel (1999).
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equity markets as a consequence. In countries like Korea, Malaysia, and
especially Thailand and Indonesia, economic collapse was followed by political
instability, as a number of countries in the region rapidly descended into a
negative downward spiral in which declining confidence undermined local
currencies, creating further problems for domestic banks, companies and
ultimately households (Krugman 1999: 94). Although the IMF was quickly called
in to try and restore stability, a number of influential observers have argued that
its actions actually made things worse rather then better (Sachs 1997), and that
its heavy-handed intervention fuelled a sense of resentment about the region’s
vulnerable position in the international system (Higgott 2000).
In trying to make sense of why the crisis occurred and why it had such a
devastating, rapid impact, different observers have stressed alternative factors
in developing their explanations. In part, explanations of the crisis, like the
earlier debate about the causses of the original ‘Asian miracle’, reflect the
theoretical and even normative prejudices of the observers. The East Asian
developmental experience has long provided an arena in which advocates of
various theoretical and developmental paradigms can utilise the Asian
experience to press their respective positions. It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that explanations of the crisis fall into quite distinctive camps. For the
more orthodoxly inclined economists who were never comfortable with the
prominent role attributed to the state in the East Asian developmental
experience generally, the crisis suggested that their arguments about the
possible dangers of close business-government relations were vindicated.
Consequently, those who consider market-led economic development to be
preferable to the state-led variety, have tended to attribute the crisis to the
domestic failings of regional economies. The emphasis has been on problems
associated with a lack of transparency, ‘crony capitalism’ and the poor policy
choices that result from close relationships between governments and powerful
economic actors (Corsetti et al 1999; Garnaut 1998). 
In contrast, commentators that have taken a more sympathetic approach to the
role of the state in the region’s development have argued that it has been the
impact of changes in the external environment within which East Asian states
operate that has undermined their overall position. Wade and Veneroso (1998),
for example, suggest that the famously high savings rates that are associated
with most of the regional economies not only provided a basis for an
indigenously financed processes of economic expansion, but could have
insulated these economies from externally generated risks. However, once the
countries of the region had been encouraged to open their capital accounts and
plug themselves more directly into global circuits of finance capital, they
became highly vulnerable to massive, often highly speculative, movements of
money, and to the judgement of the ‘international investment community’.8 In
Southeast Asia, it is suggested (Weiss 1999: 328), a lack of requisite
institutional development and concomitant state capacity to control and direct
                                                
8 Given that much of the investment into Southeast Asia recently has been in the form of short-
term lending and/or portfolio investment it is a moot point whether terms like ‘investors’ or the
even more nebulous ‘investment community’ are really useful.
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 10, 2001 9
the developmental process exacerbated these potential risks. Certainly, in the
case of the most badly affected Southeast Asian country – Indonesia – a
combination of potential access to massive capital flows that dwarfed the
Indonesian economy, and a state without the capacity, or often the desire, to
regulate such flows, provided the preconditions for disaster (Beeson 1998).
Neither side of the debate has a monopoly of wisdom in explaining the crisis.
Plainly, there were problems associated with the ‘minister’s nephew’ syndrome,
in which political connections were often more important than economic
credibility in accessing foreign funds from domestic financial intermediaries with
little regulatory oversight (Krugman 1999: 88). Yet the existence of ‘crony
capitalism’ and the possible distortion of market forces is not a sufficient
explanation of the region’s problems. Indeed, if such factors were so important,
why were they not highlighted as dangers and obstacles to growth by either
potential investors or institutions like the IMF before the crisis? In a noteworthy
fracturing of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’9 that underpinned the
market-based international economic orthodoxy, the World Bank’s chief
economist argued that there was no simple relationship between ‘corruption’, a
lack of transparency and economic crisis. On the contrary, Stiglitz (1998)
pointed out that China, one of the least open or transparent countries in the
region had been insulated because it had a closed capital account and a non-
tradeable currency. The crucial source of vulnerability as far as the Southeast
Asian economies were concerned, then, was to embark upon rapid financial
liberalisation without adequate supervisory controls, leaving them exposed to
abrupt changes in market sentiment and possible rapid capital flight.
In short, the crisis revealed, yet again, the enduring vulnerability of the countries
of Southeast Asia to more powerful external forces, both economic and political.
Not only were these economies decimated as foreign capital withdrew, but their
economic systems came under sustained reformist pressure form the likes of
the US and the IMF as a consequence. Before considering the implications of
these latter developments, it is worth spelling out the overall economic status of
the region a couple of years after the initial economic trauma.
Southeast Asia’s current economic position
One of the fundamental weaknesses that the Asian crisis exposed was the
degree of indebtedness that some of the most affected countries had
developed. However, it is important to note that unlike earlier debt crises in
Latin America, the Asian debt problem was overwhelming a private sector affair:
a symbiotic relationship developed between cash-rich lenders in the ‘North’ and
would-be borrowers in the ‘South’, which both parties appeared to believe was a
certain source of continuing profitability. Even though governments were
generally not directly involved in such relationships, the build up of debt before
the crisis, particularly the short-term form which could be rapidly withdrawn, was
one of the major factors that allowed the crisis to develop with such rapidity. In
                                                
9 The ‘Washington Consensus’ stresses fiscal discipline, financial and trade liberalization,
privatization and deregulation. See Wiiliamson (1994).
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1996, prior to the crisis, short-term debt represented more than 40% of overall
borrowing in Thailand and about 25% of borrowing in Indonesia and Malaysia.
As a percentage of foreign reserves, short-term debt represented about 100%
in Thailand, 80% in the Philippines, and a remarkable 176% in Indonesia
(Corsetti et al 1999: 36).
In the aftermath of the crisis, private capital flows to the developing world
generally have declined, as have indebtedness ratios as a consequence (World
Bank 2001: 35). In Southeast Asia, however, as Table 1 indicates,
indebtedness ratios were still on the rise in 1998 in the immediate aftermath of
the crisis and the currency collapses it initiated. Simply put, as the region’s
pegged exchange rates collapsed and their respective currencies plummeted,
the cost of servicing hitherto cheap external borrowings blew out, compounding
the affected nations problems. In such circumstances, the ability of the hardest
hit countries like Indonesia and Thailand to resist the demands of the IMF,
which offered crucial financial assistance to meet their respective debt servicing
requirements, was limited despite noteworthy domestic opposition to the role of
the IMF across the region (Hewison 2000).
Table 1: Debt Indicators (Percent)
Total External Debt to GNP Ratio
Country 1985 1995 1996 1997 1998
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
-
44.4
26.1
69.9
89.1
23
45.9
-
70
64.6
123.2
41.3
49.7
9.8
50.5
128
67.5
58.3
121.3
42
46.5
10.4
51.4
114.7
70
65
136.1
49.8
53.3
14
62.8
82.1
77.7
172.5
199.1
65.3
70.1
16.1
76.4
82.3
Source: Asian Development Bank
Despite the loss of faith in the region by the holders of mobile portfolio capital
and short-term lenders, as Table 2 indicates, with the noteworthy exception of
Indonesia, foreign direct investment (FDI) apparently held up surprisingly well.
There are three important caveats here, however. Firstly, the bulk of the
continuing flows of FDI into the region were directed toward merger and
acquisition activity. In other words, new FDI was intended to take over existing
assets that had suddenly become extremely cheap as a consequence of the
region’s collapsing currencies (Mody and Negishi 2001). Secondly, Japan has
become a much less significant source of investment for Southeast Asia than it
has been in the past. From its peak in 1996 when Japanese bank lending
accounted for 40% of all lending in Asia, it had fallen to 28% by 1999, reflecting
Japan’s own domestic economic problems. Japanese FDI also fell by 71%
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during 1998, with only 20% of Japanese companies indicating that they
intended to undertake new investment (Far Eastern Economic Review 29 July
1999). Thirdly, as Table 2 also indicates, China has received the lion’s share of
new FDI flow into the East Asian region. The potential size of China’s domestic
market, its imminent access to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and its
increasing presence in precisely the same sort of low-end manufacturing that
has traditionally been Southeast Asia’s great strength, has meant that China
has emerged as a formidable competitor, not least as a potential regional
investment location (Goad 2000). Again, the increasing disparity in economic
weight between a rising China and the much smaller economies of Southeast
Asia leave the latter potentially vulnerable to competitive pressures from their
much larger regional neighbour, a problem which looks likely to intensify as
China develops.
Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment (US$ million)
Country 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998
Cambodia - 150.8 293.6 203 220
China (PRC) 3487 35849 40180 44236 45600
Indonesia 1093 4348 6194 4677 -356
Lao PDR 6 95.4 160 90 80
Malaysia 2333 4131 5078 5106 5000
Philippines 530 1478 1517 1222 1713
Singapore 5575 7206 7883 9710 7218
Thailand 2444 2068 2335 3745 6778
Vietnam 16 1400 1500 1800 1200
Source: Asian Development Bank
Before concluding this brief overview of the current position of Southeast Asia’s
economies, it is important to consider the nature of its evolving trade
relationships as these continue to have important political ramifications and
shape the overall trajectory of the region. Historically, as noted above,
Southeast Asia’s trade relations were initially shaped by the impact of the
European colonial powers and latterly by the influence of Japan and America.
Japan has supplied the capital and technology with which the Southeast Asian
countries have produced commodities for sale in other countries, primarily the
US (Gangopadhyay 1998: 40). As a consequence, and despite rising exports of
intermediate products to Japan, Southeast Asian countries have tended to run
substantial trade deficits with Japan and trade surpluses with the US. Although
this has helped the industrialisation process throughout the region, it has tended
to reinforce its vulnerability and dependence on both the US and Japan. As
Table 3 indicates, a number of countries are heavily dependent on continued
access to and demand for exports of manufactures, especially electrical goods
to the US and to a lesser extent Japan. However, in the event of a sustained
downturn in the US (see Brenner 2001), countries like Malaysia look extremely
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exposed to shifting external conditions. Although, as Table 4 indicates, intra-
regional East Asian trade now accounts for nearly half of overall trade, much of
this is a reflection of the pivotal role of Japan and the trade in intermediate
goods. Significantly, more than a quarter of the region’s exports continue to be
absorbed by North America, a factor that continues to influence the behaviour
and limit the options of the countries of East Asia.
Table 3: Electronic Equipment Exports
Exports as % of GDP, 1999
to:
         US                   Japan
IT equipment
as % of total
exports, 1999
Total external
debt as % of
exports, 2000
Indonesia 6.0 7.4 13 203
Malaysia 23.5 12.5 53 41
Philippines 13.7 6.1 63 98
Singapore 26 10.0 52 5
Thailand 10.7 7.2 26 92
Source: The Economist
Table 4: Intra- and Inter-Regional trade, 1999
(Direction and Percentage)
Destination
Origin North
America
Latin
America
Western
Europe
Eastern
Europe
Africa Middle
East
Asia
North America 39.6 15.6 19.4 0.7 1.2 2.4 21.1
Latin America 61.6 16.0 12.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 6.0
Western Europe 9.9 2.4 69.1 5.1 2.5 2.4 7.5
Eastern Europe 4.4 1.9 56.0 26.1 1.2 1.9 7.4
Africa 14.9 3.0 51.0 1.2 9.9 1.5 13.8
Middle East 14.8 1.3 20.2 0.7 4.7 8.3 42.9
Asia 26.3 2.5 18.1 0.9 1.5 2.6 46.6
World 22.0 5.4 42.2 3.7 2.1 2.5 20.9
Source: World Trade Organisation
Overall, then, while the Southeast Asian nations have benefited from their
incorporation into an overarching regional division of labour, their position
remains dependent and vulnerable. Not only can changes in market sentiment
inflict major damage on their economies and developmental prospects leaving
them vulnerable to the influence of powerful IFIs, but the manner of their
integration into regional and global production structures means that
industrialisation processes are often shaped by patterns of economic integration
that remain centred on the established industrial heartlands of North America,
Western Europe and Northeast Asia (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995). In such
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circumstances, the countries of Southeast Asia have attempted to develop
political and strategic responses that will lessen their vulnerability and improve
their overall position. An examination of these initiatives tells us much about the
possible future development trajectory of the region. 
The Politics of Economic Vulnerability
Before considering some of the specific domestic and region-wide political
responses to Southeast Asia’s economically vulnerable position, it is worth
placing the debate about the region’s political development in a wider
theoretical and global context. This is important because there are widely held
expectations about what some see as the inevitable course of political and
economic development in the contemporary period. The most conspicuous
example of this idea is Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ thesis, which
suggests, in essence, that capitalist liberal democracy is the developmental end
point to which all countries are destined. Even more empirically grounded
analyses of political development have suggested that there is compelling
evidence that democracy is indeed spreading throughout the world in
successive ‘waves’ which incorporate increasing numbers of countries
(Huntington 1993). While there is clearly something in this contention, it is also
important to recognise that democratic consolidation is highly dependent on
continuing economic stability and growth, as well as the institutionalisation and
routinization of democratic practices themselves (Haggard and Kaufman 1995).
More fundamentally, it should be emphasised that there is no necessary
relationship between capitalist based development – however successful – and
specific political practices. Indeed, Bowles and Gintis (1986) argue that in many
ways the economic polarisation associated with a market-oriented system,
which entrenches economic privilege through legally sanctioned property rights,
is fundamentally incompatible with a more broadly defined notion of democracy
that includes equality of economic opportunity and the exercise of individual
rights.
These theoretical caveats notwithstanding, the current situation in post-crisis
Southeast Asia is, in any case, sufficiently dire to have undermined optimistic
prognoses about its development. Paradoxically enough, what seems to be
emerging in the region is a volatile combination of continuity and change, that
reflects a complex mix of internal and external factors. Both are important and
merit examination.
Domestic political pressures
It should be re-emphasised that political development in Southeast Asia is
intimately bound up with, and cannot be separated from, prevailing economic
circumstances. While the state may have played a significant role in most of
East Asia’s developmental experience, in Southeast Asia the relationship
between key economic actors and political elites has often be extremely close, if
not inseparable. As a consequence, major political and economic players have
frequently been precisely the same people, with the result that major political
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struggles are frequently played out within the confines of the state itself, rather
than within what are often still inadequately developed civil societies
(Jayasuriya 1995). This has major implications for the type of future
development that can be expected to occur – a crucial consideration given the
pressure placed on these countries to adopt policies in keeping with
predominantly ‘western’ ideas of ‘good governance’.10 A brief glance at the
experiences of some of the more important regional countries, especially
following the recent crisis, will illustrate this point.
Indonesia is both the most populous and the most badly affected of Southeast
Asia’s crisis countries. Although many celebrated the demise of Suharto, the
highly entrenched system of patronage politics over which he presided has not
disappeared,11 nor has his demise ushered in a new era of governmental
competence and transparency. Given the scale of Indonesia’s problems this is,
perhaps, unsurprising. After years of steady economic growth, the scale of
Indonesia’s collapse was starkly revealed by the renewed spectre of starvation
in Indonesia in the aftermath of the crisis (Australian 4-5 July 1998). Even
though some limited recovery has now occurred, Indonesia’s future prospects
are blighted by the size of its accumulated debts. Overall, it is estimated that
Indonesia owes some US$262 billion or 170% of GDP, of which US$152 is
government debt (Australian 28 February 2001). The agency charged with
resolving the debt problem and instituting economic reform – the Indonesian
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) – is widely considered to be incompetent
and lacking in the political authority or leverage to challenge the powerful vested
interests that constitute Indonesia’s distinctive political-economy (Caragata
2001). Compounding Indonesia’s problems is the simultaneous challenge of
attempting to develop new patterns of decentralised political rule while
confronting the possible fragmentation of the nation itself, as ethnic minorities
take the opportunity to put pressure on a weakened central government. All this
at a time when the government itself is wracked by internal political
manoeuvring and a widespread doubts about the competence and democratic
credentials of the Presidency of former Muslim cleric, Abdurrahman Wahid
(Vatikiotis and McBeth 2001).
Similarly, the country that was at the original epicentre of the crisis – Thailand –
although initially praised by the IMF for its willingness to adopt the full panoply
of neoliberal reforms, has recently seen a resurgence of ‘money politics’ and
political corruption. Thailand’s recent history illustrates the acutely difficult
position Southeast Asian governments find themselves in. The coalition
government of Chuan Leekpai, which took office in the immediate aftermath of
the original crisis, attempted to demonstrate its orthodox economic
management credentials to both the IMF and foreign investors. However, there
has been widespread domestic opposition to the intrusive role of the IMF and
the painful reforms it advocates, partly from non-governmental organisations
and organised labour, but also from elements of the domestic business class
                                                
10 For a more detailed explanation of the implications of this issue, see Beeson (forthcoming).
11 See Robison (1997) for a highly readable overview of Indonesia’s Suharto-era political-
economy.
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(Hewison 2000). After growing at between 6-10 per cent for a number of years,
in 1998 Thailand’s economy contracted by a massive 10 per cent (Hartcher
2001: 80), paving the way for rise of the populist government of prominent
business tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra, which rode to power on promises of
increased public spending and blatant pork-barrelling. Ominously for the future
of Thailand’s continuing political reform process, there are signs that Thaksin is
using his economic leverage and control of the local media to stifle debate
about his trial on corruption charges (Far Eastern Economic Review 26 April
2001). Revealingly, Thaksin’s first prime ministerial trip was to Malaysia – the
Southeast Asian country which has been most vocal in criticising ‘western’
reform initiatives and championing Asian alternatives.
Not only has Malaysia attempted to pursue its own distinctive response to the
crisis in particular and the challenge of economic development more generally,
but it has also, as we shall see, been at the forefront of promoting East Asian
regionalism. The Malaysian response to the crisis was motivated both by the
apparent failure of the orthodox IMF remedy, and by a number of contingent
politico-economic factors that made possibly incurring the wrath of foreign
investors and the IFIs a risk worth taking. At the heart of Malaysia’s economic
policies under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has been a
desire to accommodate or overcome the twin colonial legacies of an ethnically
divided population and a resource dependent economic structure. This
produced a pattern of development in which political and economic activities
became highly integrated, as the indigenous Malay class assumed a pivotal
position through policies of positive discrimination. The United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO) became the principal expression of this dominance and
the centre of a comprehensive system of political and economic patronage
(Gomez and Jomo 1997). In such circumstances, where non-transparent
business-government relations are central to the operation of the Malaysian
political-economy, it is less surprising that Malaysia should be willing to flout
conventional orthodoxy and experiment with capital controls as a response to
the crisis. Yet the self-serving motivations for Malaysia’s post-crisis policies
notwithstanding, it effectively demonstrated that even the governments of small
economies have policy options in a global economy (Beeson 2000).
If nothing else, the Malaysian experiment – so far, at least – has managed to
ward off the sort of political crisis that has engulfed Indonesia and the
Philippines. The Philippines was initially considered to have been less badly
affected by the crisis because of its more liberalised economy and the
substantial economic reforms – including challenging the position of politically
powerful cartels and monopolies – which occurred under the administration of
Fidel Ramos during the 1990s (Hutchcroft 1999: 164-67). It should also be
noted, however, that the Philippines’ much slower growth rates compared to
those of its neighbours during the boom years meant it attracted smaller capital
inflows and there was thus less risk of a dramatic turn-around in investor
sentiment. The subsequent descent into political and – to a lesser extent –
Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 10, 2001 16
economic chaos was a major blow to the alternative, IFI-approved,12 route to
economic development (Bello 2000). In any case, the subtleties of the
Philippines’ distinctive position and liberalisation efforts were clearly lost on
foreign investors and currency speculators who sold the peso down anyway.
Although the election of Joseph Estrada in May 1998 was viewed with some
dismay by many outside observers who doubted his economic credibility, it is
worth pointing out that Estrada persisted with many of the personnel and
policies - especially the commitment to trade liberalisation - of his predecessor.
His subsequent exposure and removal for alleged corruption may have
provided a convenient scapegoat for the apparent failings of orthodox policy
reform, but it has done little to change the fundamentals of the Philippine
situation. On the contrary, the installation of the supposedly reformist and
‘clean’ administration of new President Gloria Arroyo, has been described as a
‘“soft revolution” that ejected an elected president in order to return to the old,
wealthy political and business elite to power’ (Sheehan 2001).
Despite the traumas induced by the crisis, therefore, some of the fundamental
relationships and structures that characterise political and economic
relationships in Southeast Asia have not been radically transformed. Even
though some of the dramatis personae may have been changed, the script
looks surprisingly familiar. Indeed, it should be noted that even in Singapore,
clearly Southeast Asia’s most economically developed nation, political
liberalisation and a shift from authoritarianism has not been the inevitable
corollary of rising living standards. On the contrary, the Singaporean
government has displayed a remarkable capacity to retain a form of one party
rule and effective social control (Rodan 1996). Somewhat ironically, it may
prove to be the newer members of ASEAN and the least developed economies
of Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which will undergo the most
profound long-term changes. Vietnam is the quintessential Southeast Asian
example of a country which is attempting to make the transition from
‘communism’ to capitalism, while attempting to retain some of the doctrine,
ideology and personnel of its former socialist incarnation. It may find that, while
it can develop a distinctive form of capitalism, it will effectively obliterate the
political and economic practices that were associated with life in Vietnam under
the old order (Kolko 1997).
Collective responses to external imperatives
Although Southeast Asia’s domestic difficulties may serve as a stark reminder
of the individual weakness of the region’s economies and the fragility of its
political structures, their collective response to crisis and the challenge of
vulnerability have been innovative, and may yet help to re-shape the broader
East Asian region of which they are a part. The proposed ‘ASEAN + 3’ grouping
could – if realised – fundamentally transform the long-term trajectory of the
region and its place in the wider international system. Before assessing its
prospects, it is useful to re-consider ASEAN’s own development as this
                                                
12 Both the IMF and the World Bank exerted a major influence over Philippine policy under Fidel
Ramos during the 1990s. See Bello (2000).
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illustrates some of the potential pitfalls and benefits that confront the nascent
grouping.
The first point to emphasise about ASEAN’s own evolution was that it was
primarily a response to the perceived vulnerability of the ASEAN states at the
height of the Cold War (Frost 1990). The Vietnam War, the rise of China, and
the chronic insecurity that pervaded the region at the time – 1967 – ASEAN was
founded, provided compelling reasons to overcome simmering intra-regional
tensions, especially between Indonesia and Malaysia, and seek greater security
through collaboration. It should also be stressed that the overall orientation to
security that distinguishes most of East Asia, and which helps to explain their
approach to both domestic and foreign policy, owes much to an overwhelming
preoccupation with maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the state itself.
Algappa (1998: 622) argues that there are three core concerns that underpin
this overriding preoccupation with political survival, ‘territorial integrity,
international challenges to their political ideologies, and constraints on their
autonomy’. The attractions of the so-called ‘ASEAN way’, or the commitment to
non-interference in the domestic affairs of members, and the preference for
consensus-based decision making processes, become easier to understand as
a consequence (see Acharya 1997)
And yet, even before the crisis engulfed Southeast Asia, the members of
ASEAN were having to address uncomfortable questions about the role of
ASEAN itself and the basis of future intra-regional relations. In a post-Cold War
environment, the security imperatives became less compelling, and ASEAN
attempted to develop a new raison d’être. The increased primacy of economic
development that has characterised the post-Cold War world, also influenced
Southeast Asia, and was epitomised by the inauguration of the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992. From the outset, however, the goal of trade
liberalisation and intensification within the ASEAN area was elusive because of
the competitive rather than complimentary nature of the region’s economies,
something reflected in the very low levels of trade between ASEAN members.13
As a consequence, Ariff (1997: 85-86) argues, AFTA’s success should be
judged by its capacity to boost overall trade, not simply trade within the region
as in comparable regional trade agreements. But even when judged by this less
demanding calculus, AFTA can only be considered a limited success. Despite
the rise of a pro-trade liberalisation business lobby across the region (Stubbs
2000), there remain formidable roadblocks to implementing AFTA’s agenda of
tariff reduction, not the least of which are strategically important domestic
economic sectors like Malaysia’s car industry (Asiaweek 25 August 2000).
The other distinctive and potentially far-reaching innovation that has been
touted, if not implemented, has been the suggestion that ASEAN should change
its underlying modus operandi and allow for greater ‘interference’ in each others
domestic affairs. Thailand has played the most prominent role is advocating a
policy of ‘flexible engagement’ in which members would more closely coordinate
                                                
13 Without the pivotal entrepot role played by Singapore, intra-ASEAN trade is only 5% of total
ASEAN trade. See Chia Siow Yue (1998: 217).
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macroeconomic policies and be given greater licence to criticise the domestic
policies of fellow members. Significantly, it was ASEAN’s noteworthy failure to
play a crisis management role, and its vulnerability to criticisms of
ineffectiveness and non-transparency that lay behind the Thai initiative (Haacke
1999). Despite this potentially significant initiative, however, the ASEAN
grouping has proved unable to build upon it. Not only has the ‘widening’ of
ASEAN to include the less politically and economically developed countries of
Indochina and Myanmar made both the coordination of policies and the
deflection of criticisms about human rights issues more difficult (Henderson
1999), but Thailand itself has advocated a return to a more ‘Asian way’ under
the new Thaksin government (Far Eastern Economic Review 22 February,
2001: 26-27). For ASEAN sceptics, such behaviour was simply confirmation of
their belief that ASEAN was primarily interested ‘in the art of conflict avoidance,
but not conflict resolution’ (Narine 1999: 360).
These developments remind us that there is nothing certain about either the
direction or inevitability of ASEAN’s institutional evolution. Although there are
grounds for scepticism about the capacity of the Southeast Asian nations to
initiate or sustain reform, they are central actors within what may prove to be
one of the most significant developments in the evolution of regioness in East
Asia. ‘ASEAN + 3’, which includes Japan, China and South Korea in addition to
the ASEAN states, represents a potentially major regional grouping with a
substantial internal market and major financial strength. Indeed, one of the
principal attractions of such a grouping was the economic weight and thus
independence that such a collaborative enterprise might provide. The East
Asian crisis dramatically highlighted the entire region’s vulnerability to both
externally-generated economic dislocation, and to subsequent political
intervention from IFIs and the US. As ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo
Sevrino (1999) observed, ‘recent events have made clear that there is no other
course but closer economic integration and political solidarity in ASEAN, there
are precious few alternatives to closer cooperation in the larger region of East
Asia’.
Certainly there is much that could yet derail ASEAN + 3. Japan’s initial
reluctance to develop its proposed Asian Monetary Fund in the face of US
opposition (see Higgott 2000: 268-73), and the sheer technical complexity of
developing currency swap mechanism with which to insulate the region from
future financial crises, suggest that even if lingering animosities between key
members can be overcome, there will still be formidable challenges for the
region’s limited institutional capacity to overcome. Nevertheless, the fact that
the ASEAN + 3 relationship was formalised in late 1999 is indicative of perhaps
surprising momentum behind the project.14 ASEAN + 3 is essentially Dr
Mahathir’s proposed East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) by another name
(see Hook 1999). The fact that ASEAN + 3 has succeeded in at least making a
beginning, whereas Mahathir’s project was frustrated by a combination of US
                                                
14 For an indication of ASEAN + 3’s potential agenda see ASEAN (1999)
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opposition and Japanese ambivalence, is indicative of greater regional resolve
and a significantly different post-crisis political context.
Even if ASEAN + 3 does develop and ultimately offers a more powerful vehicle
for the expression of East Asian regionness, however, there is no guarantee
that this will be of unalloyed benefit for the smaller Southeast Asian economies.
Certainly, ASEAN + 3 may provide a shell within which East Asian versions of
capitalist organisation may continue. It may even provide a platform for a
rearticulation of the so-called ‘Asian values’ discourse which was such a
prominent and distinctive part of Southeast Asia’s identity during the boom
years.15 But even a successful ASEAN + 3 will see its Southeast Asian nations
overshadowed by the strategic, economic and political weight of their regional
neighbours. In such circumstances, as the earlier relationship with Japan vividly
demonstrates (Beeson 2001b), there is nothing to suggest that Southeast Asia
will escape from the politics of vulnerability.
Concluding Remarks
Southeast Asia has never been the master of its own destiny. Indeed, its very
identity, economic structures and social formations have shaped by powerful
external forces it had only a limited capacity to influence of deflect. The recent
East Asian crisis vividly demonstrated that little has changed in this regard.
What has changed, perhaps, is the speed with which the multifaceted forces
associated with globalisation can profoundly undercut the developmental
strategies, prospects and autonomy of these nations as they grapple with the
challenges of complex interdependence in an increasingly integrated global
political economy. Such forces are proving formidable challenges for even the
established industrial democracies that can draw on comparatively competent,
long-established state capacities with which to manage them. The more
vulnerable nations of Southeast Asia are doubly disadvantaged by comparison,
in that they suffer from both less competent governments and more acutely
pressing problems. In such circumstances it is, perhaps, surprising that they
made the progress they did before the recent crisis brought them undone.
In a region as volatile as Southeast Asia, prediction is a foolhardy enterprise.
However, the surprising durability of ASEAN, its lack of tangible achievements
notwithstanding, suggests that there is a desire to maintain some sense of
regional solidarity and identity in the face of common adversity. If this
momentum can be sustained and translated to the wider ASEAN + 3 grouping,
the possibility that a more significant regional entity will develop – of which the
Southeast Asian nations would be an important part – cannot be discounted.
Whether this will deliver significant benefits to the less powerful nations of
Southeast Asia is a moot point. It may, however, provide a more insulated
environment in which distinctively Asian style developmental projects can be
taken up once more.
                                                
15 For a useful discussion of the Asian values debate see Bauer and Bell (1999).
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